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THE PRESS AND THE OPPRESSED-A STUDY OF PREJUDICIAL NEWS
REPORTING IN CRIMINAL CASES*
Part I: The Problem, Existing Solutions and Remaining Doubts
CAROLYN JAFFE
Miss Jaffe is a member of the Illinois Bar. She is presently serving as Law Clerk to the Honorable
Julius J. Hoffman of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. She received the LL.B. degree in 1963 and the LL.M. degree in 1964 from the Northwestern University
School of Law, the latter under a Ford Foundation Fellowship in Criminal Law. Miss Jaffe has
served as Abstractor of Recent Cases for this Journal since 1961 and acted as Managing Editor of
the Norlhweslern Uniersitv Law Review in 1962-1963.

When the news media publicize information commonly referred to as "prejudicial publicity," a
criminal defendant's right to a fair trial may be jeopardized. In Part I of this two-part article, the
author first examines the applicable standards of impartiality which a jury must meet in order for
a trial to be constitutionally "fair," and then defines that "prejudicial publicity" which can render
a jury unconstitutionally partial and hence a trial not constitutionally fair. Finally, existing methods
which have been used in an attempt to Orevent defendants from being convicted by juries rendered
partial by publicity are critically examined, with emphasis on the effect of each of these methods
upon the co-existing interests of the press, the defendant, and the Government which are sought to be
preserved.
In Part II, scheduled to he published in the next issue of the Journal, the author examines the
possibility of expanding some of the existing solutions, with emphasis on the importance of formulating and making known to the press, Bar, and police a set of standards delineating the kinds of
material which are likely to deprive a defendant of a fair trial. After examining the sources of prejudicial publicity and noting the probable futility of internal control by the press., the author proposes a remedial statute. Results of a poll of lawyers, police officials, and newsmen conducted by the
author are tabulated in appendices to Part II.-EDITOR.

In the exercise of their constitutional right to
freedom of the press, news media publish information concerning criminal cases. In the exercise of
hi constitutional right to a fair trial, every criminal defendant may demand trial by an impartial
jury. Often, however, publicity exposes potential
or actual jury members to information which is
not eventually admitted in evidence at the trial.
By thus enabling the jury to consider incompetent
material, publicity can be prejudicial to the defendant, with the result that he is unable effectively to exercise his right to a fair trial. Frequent
conflict between these fundamental rights constitutes a serious problem to the administration of
This article was submitted by the author in partial
fulfillment of the requirements of the degree of .Master
of Laws, Northwestern University School of Law.
M.ay 1964. Minor changes have been made to bring it
up to date.

criminal justice and raises the question of how
the criminal defendant's right to a fair trial can be
preserved without infringement of the equally
important right to freedom of the press. A third
right is also concerned whenever this conflict occurs-that of the prosecuting government to perform one of its vested functions, the administration
of criminal justice.
In an effort to formulate a solution to this increasingly serious problem, these articles will review the elements of these three distinct rights:
that of the defendant to a fair trial, that of the
government fairly to administer criminal justice,
and that of the news media to freedom of the
press; will attempt to define what is meant by the
phrase "prejudicial publicity;" and will analyze
the efficacy of existing methods of attempting to
deal with the problem in the light of their respec-
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if the jury system is used, the jury must be impartial. 6 Consequently, defendants in state as well
as federal criminal prosecutions possess a right to
I: AN IMPARTIAL JURY
trial by an impartial jury.
To satisfy federal constitutional requirements,
The United States Constitution entitles every
the
jury must meet the federal constitutional
defendant in a federal criminal action to a fair
7
trial by an impartial jury.2 Although the Constitu- standard in state as well as federal criminal cases.
Since
this
standard
is
not
specified
in
the
Constitution does not require the states to provide trial by
tion, it has been variously fashioned by the courts.
jury,3 every state by its own constitution guaran4
"Impartiality is not a technical conception. It is a
tees jury trials in criminal cases. The Constitution
does require, however, that whatever methods a state of mind. For the ascertainment of this mental
state elects to use for disposition of criminal cases attitude of appropriate indifference, the Constitumust be in accordance with due process of law;1 tion lays down no particular tests and procedure
is not chained to any ancient and artificial forI A related question involving the same constitu- mula." Because "The theory of our system is that
tional rights is whether courtroom photography and
broadcasting should be permitted. ABA Canon of Ju- conclusions to be reached in a case will be induced
dicial Ethics 35 flatly prohibits use of any cameras in only by evidence and argument in open court, and
court. Texas and Colorado alone have not adopted this not by any outside information, whether of private
Canon. Some controversy was recently afoot regarding
9
theproprietyof televisingthe Texas murder trial of Jack talk or public print," the basic question in resolvRuby, who killed Lee Harvey Oswald, alleged assassin ing the issue whether a trier of fact possesses this
Kennedy, on television.
of the late President John F.
"mental attitude of appropriate indifference" is
See Time, Dec. 13, 1963, p. 8 2 .JudgeBrown announced
"whether
he has the ability to decide the facts in a
on Dec. 19, 1963, that all still cameras and electrical
equipment, as well as television broadcasting equip- criminal case solely on the basis of the evidence
ment, would be banned from Ruby's trial in his courtroom. Further, there has been controversy within the presented in court. Obviously a juror with this
ABA itself as to whether or not the Canon should be ability is the impartial juror required by the fed-,
amended to permit photography and broadcasting at
eral constitutional standard. And since, within the
the discretion of the trial judge. See Wilkin, Judicial
tive effects on the co-existing and conflicting rights
sought to be preserved.'

Canon35 Should Not Be Changed,48 A.B.AJ. 540 (1962).

Although broadcast of court proceedings may impede
the judicial process and impugn its integrity, the reasons are wholly different from those which indicate that
publication of prejudicial publicity about a criminal
case will have that same deleterious effect.
2 U.S. CONST. amend. VI prevents federal abridge-

ment of the right to a trial by jury in criminal cases.
3 The fourteenth amendment has not been held to
require the states to grant a right to trial by jury equivalent to the sixth amendment right. Irvin v. Dowd, 366
U.S. 717, 721 (1961) (dictum); Palko v. Connecticut,
3024 U.S. 319,324 (1937) (dictum).
COLUMBIA UUiv. LEGisLATIrE DRAF ING AND RESEARcH FUND, INDEX DIGEST OF STATE CONSTITUTIONS 578-79 (1959).

5 Upholding the constitutionality of New York's
statutory "blue ribbon jury" system in criminal cases,
whereby lists of prospective jurors were limited by
occupation, the United States Supreme Court stated:
"The function of this federal court under the Fourteenth
Amendment in reference to state juries is not to prescribe procedures but is essentially to protect the integrity of the trial process by whatever means the state
sees fit to employ." Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261,
294 (1947). Accord, Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581, 605
(1900) (due process does not require states to provide
for indictment by grand jury) ("[T]he state has full
control over the procedure in its courts, both in civil
and criminal cases ... ."); Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U.S.

90, 93 (1875) (trial by jury need not be granted by the
state in common law cases-the requirement of due
process is met "if the trial is had according to the settled
course of judicial proceedings.").
For examples of non-jury proceedings which, though
judicial, did not satisfy due process, see In re Murchi-

scope of this paper, impartiality of the jury is the

determinant of whether or not a given trial was
fair, nothing less than trial before a jury composed
of such impartial jurors is a fair trial. The problem
of how to establish the existence of this ability
entails" both the substantive test of impartiality
used and the procedure for applying the test.
Until recently, with but a few exceptions, the
substantive test of whether a juror is sufficiently
impartial has been whether he testifies that he can
render a fair and impartial verdict based solely on
the evidence presented at the trial. If this criterion
is met, a juror is not challengeable for cause, nor
is his presence on the jury grounds for mistrial or
continuance merely because he has been exposed
son, 349 U.S. 133 (1955); In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257
(1948).
6
Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961); Spies v. Illinois, 123 U.S. 131 (1887). See Riave, Fairand Impartial
Trial by Jury in the United States and in England, 50

A.B.A.J.
232, 233 (1964).
T

Federal: Frazier v. United States, 335 U.S. 497

(1948); United States v. Wood, 299 U.S. 123 (1936);
Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245 (1910); Reynolds v.
United States, 98 U S. 145 (1878). State: Rideau v.
Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723 (1963); Irvin v. Dowd, supra
note
6, at 727; Spies v. Illinois, supra note 6.
8
United States v. Wood, supra note 7, at 145-46,
cited in Irvin v. Dowd, supra note 6, at 724-25.
9 Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 462 (1907).
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to prejudicial articles or broadcasts, even if he
admits that he has formed an opinion as to the
guilt or innocence of the accused. 10 Recognizing
the intricacies and frailties of human nature, the
federal courts and a few state courts have recently
held this test an inadequate measure of impartiality, with the result that a juror with preconceived
opinions of an accused's guilt may be found partial
if his declaration of impartiality, sincere though
it may be, is objectively untenable in the light of
his exposure to extrajudicial information about the
case.U1 The following statement by the Supreme
Court of Florida is illustrative:
"[A] juror's statement that he can and will re10 Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245 (1910); Hopt
v. Utah, 120 U.S. 430 (1887); Reynolds v. United
States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878); Dillon v. United States, 218
F.2d 97 (8th Cir. 1955); Rowley v. United States, 185
F.2d 523 (8th Cir. 1950); United States v. Griffin, 176
F.2d 727 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 952 (1950);
United States v. Carruthers, 152 F.2d 512 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 327 U.S. 787 (1945); Commonwealth v.
Geagan, 339 Mass. 487, 505-07, 159 N.E.2d 870, 88385, cert. denied, 361 U.S. 895 (1959); State v. LaRocca,
81 N.J. Super. 40, 194 A.2d 578 (App. Div. 1963);
State v. Moran, 142 Mont. 423, 448-51, 384 P.2d 777,
790-92 (1963). See Hormys, T a S-mi--A
MUaDR
CAsE 303-07 (1961), for an example of the hardship this
criterion can impose on a defendant. See Sheppard v.
Maxwell, 231 F. Supp. 37 (S.D. Ohio 1964), for the
outcome of Dr. Sam Sheppard's case.
Since each state conviction invalidated by the United
States Supreme Court on prejudicial publicity grounds
had been rendered by a jury of which more than one
member was found or deemed partial, the question
whether the presence on a jury of one juror who states
that he has an opinion which he can lay aside causes
that jury to be unconstitutionally partial-and hence
the included question whether that test is constitutionally permissible-has not yet been decided by the Court.
In Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961), eight of the
jurors had so stated; in Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S.
723 (1963), the Court presumed prejudice. See text
accompanying notes 17 & 18 infra.
"See United States ex rel. Bloeth v. Denno, 313
F.2d 364 (2d Cir. 1963). "The influence that lurks in an
opinion once formed is so persistent that it unconsciously fights detachm, nt from the mental processes of
the average man." Irvin v. Dowd, supra note 10, at
728. "No doubt ead juror was sincere when he said
that he would be fair and. impartial to petitioner....
[but] where so many, so many times, admitted prejudice, such a statement of impartiality can be given little
weight." Ibid. See Sheppard v. Maxwell, 231 F. Supp.
37, 58, 60 (S.D. Ohio 1964); SuLx-vAx, TIAL BY
NEywsPAPER 232-33 (1961). See also Stroble v. California, 343 U.S. 181, 198 (1952) (dissenting opinion of

Frankfurter, J.); Shepherd v. Florida, 341 U.S. 50, 50
(1951) (specially concurring opinion of Jackson, J.);
Coppedge v. United States, 272 F.2d 504, 505-08
(D.C. Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 855 (1961);
Delaney v. United States, 199 F.2d 107, 113-14 (Ist
Cir. 1952); United States v. Smith, 200 F. Supp. 885
(D. Vt. 1962). See note 90 infra and accompanying
text.
However, the mere jresence of an opinion as to the

turn a verdict according to the evidence submitted and the law'announced at the trial is not
determinative of his competence [impartiality],
if it appears from other statements made by him

orfrom other evidence that he is not possessed of
a state of mind which will enable him to do so."
Generally, the defendant complaining that his
trial was unfair due to prejudicial publicity bears
the burden of proving actual rather than speculative prejudice.u While speculative prejudice is
established upon proof of the existence of a condition which might result in prejudice, actual
prejudice is not established unless it is proved that
at least one juror in fact formed an opinion which
influenced his verdict. The "actual prejudice" test
compelled affirmance in two recent cases where,
although newspapers containing highly prejudicial
material were found in the jury room, the defendant failed to prove that any juror read the articles. 14
guilt or innocence of the accused, without more, cannot
disqualify a juror who attests to his ability to be fair
apd impartial. The trial court must "determine whether
the nature and strength of the opinion formed are such
as, in law, necessarily to raise the presumption of partiality." Reynolds v. United States, supra note 10, at
156.
1 Singer v. State, 109 So. 2d 7, 24 (Fla. 1959). (Emphasis added.) To allow the mere presence of an opinion to disquality a juror, it is said, would render it impossible to conduct jury trials under present conditions
of press coverage. Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245,
251 (1910); United States v. Keegan, 141 F.2d 245,
258 (2d Cir. 1944); Baltimore Radio Show v. State, 193
Md. 300, 330, 67 A.2d 497, 511 (1949), cer. denied, 338
U.S. 912 (1950).
Nevertheless, two trial courts in 1963 found it possible. A federal trial court in Minnesota excused potential jurors for the mere presence of opinion, United
States v. Kline, 221 F. Supp. 776 (D. Minn. 1963),
while a state trial court in Washington excused all potential jurors who might possibly have formed an opinion. State v. St. Peter, 63 Wash. 2d 495, 387 P.2d 937
(1963) (all who had read or heard of defendant were
excused).
Query whether the "mere presence of an opinion,
without more" does not deprive the defendant of the
presumption of innocence. See Irvin v. Dowd, supra
note 10; United States ex rd. Bloeth v. Denno, supra

note 11; Marson v. United States, 203 F.2d 904, 909
(6th Cir. 1953); Delaney v. United States, 199 F.2d
107, 114 (1st Cir. 1952); Singer v. State, supra at
23-24.

13Stroble v. California, 343 U.S. 181, 198 (1952);
Ferrari v. United States, 244 F.2d 132, 138 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 355 U.S. 878 (1957); Smith v. United
States, 236 F.2d 260, 269-70 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
352 U.S. 909 (1956); United States v. Carruthers, 152
F.2d 512, 519 (7th Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 327 U.S.
487 (1946); Oxenberg v. State, 362 P.2d 893, 899
(Alaska), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 56 (1961); Morgan v.
State, 211 Ga. 172, 84 S.E.2d 365 (1954).

" United States v. Leviton, 193 F.2d 848, 857 (2d
Cir. 1951); State v. Harris, 62 Wash. 2d 858, 863-65,
385 P.2d 18, 22-24 (1963).
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However, it has been held that when potentially
prejudicial material has been publicized, a presumption of prejudice arises."5 For example, in
Commonwealth v. Crehan,6 the Massachusetts
Supreme Court presumed prejudice because the
jury was allowed to separate, and since the trial
court denied defendant's motion to poll the jury
after damaging articles were published, it was impossible to rebut the presumption of prejudice.
In Rideau v. Louisiana,' where a film of defendant's interrogation by a group of local police officials and his confession were broadcast on several
occasions over a local television station, the United
States Supreme Court reversed defendant's state
murder conviction without even using the transcript of the voir dire examination to ascertain
whether any juror had seen the film. The Court
held that the highly prejudicial nature and wide
dissemination of the film rendered a fair trial in
that locality impossible, and therefore examination
of the voir dire was unnecessary. In Inin v. Dmod,5
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the first Supreme Court case upsetting a state
conviction on prejudicial publicity grounds, the
Court had found the jury not sufficiently impartial
after carefully considering the voir dire." The
Rideau case is the first in which the Supreme
Court has reversed a state conviction on proof of
speculative prejudice.
Because a trial judge has broad discretion in such
matters, an appellate court will not overturn a
finding of impartiality unless error is so manifest
that the judge's action amounts to an abuse of
that discretion."
With this background in mind, we must now
try to define exactly what is the "prejudicial
publicity" which can operate to deprive a defendant of that impartial jury to which his federal
constitutional right to a fair trial entitles him.

II: WHAT IS "PREJUICIAL PuBLIcry"?
The trier of fact in a criminal case must reach
its conclusions as to a defendant's guilt only on
the basis of evidence presented in open court, and
"6United States v; Accardo, 298 F.2d 133 (7th Cir. not on any outside influence. A jury failing to ac1962); Briggs v. United States, 221 F.2d 636, 639 (6th complish this task does not meet federal constituCir. 1955). When the presumption arises, the trial judge tional standards of impartiality, and the trial at
must take steps considered necessary by him to rebut it,
and if not convinced that it has been rebutted, he must which the jury is not properly impartial is not
"a fair trial" within the federal constitutional regrant the requested relief (see notes 68-81 infra and
accompanying text). Ibid. The court in Briggs relied on
19Eight of the 12 jurors stated that they had an
Stone v. United States,'113 F.2d 70 (6th Cir. 1940), a
case involving attempted bribery of a juror. The court opinion as to defendant's guilt which, they further
in the Stone case stated the applicable rule:
stated, they could set aside. See id. at 728.
"The question is, not whether any actual wrong
20 Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245, 248 (1910);
resulted... but whether [the circumstances] created Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 156 (1878);
a condition from which prejudice might arise....
Hoffa v. Gray, 323 F.2d 178 (6th Cir. 1963); Dillon v.
[T]he law concerning juries .. . presumes that [out- United States, 218 F.2d 97, 103 (8th Cir. 1955);
side] influence may act on some of them ... so as to Delaney v. United States, 199 F.2d 107, 114 (1st Cir.
be beyond detection."
1952); Rowley v. United States, 185 F.2d 523 (8th Cir.
Id. at 77.
1950); Stunz v. United States, 27 F.2d 575, 578 (8th
This principle was applied by the Supreme Court of Cir. 1928); Perez v. State, 236 Ark. 921, 370 S.W.2d
Vermont in the recent civil case of Bellows Falls Village 613 (1963); Hammons v. People, 385 P.2d 592, 595
Corp. v. State Highway Bd., 123 Vt. 408, 190 A.2d 695 (Colo. 1963); Singer v. State, 109 So. 2d 7, 13 (Fla.
(1963). Upon finding that eight of the jurors had either 1959); State v. Hickock, 188 Kan. 473, 482, 363 P.2d
read the contents of or heard about an editorial slanted 541,548 (1961); Nickell v. Commonwealth, 371 S.W.2d
against the defendant, the trial court set aside a con- 849 (Ky. 1963); Commonwealth v. Geagan, 339 Mass.
demnation award for plaintiff and ordered a new trial. 487, 501, 508, 159 N.E.2d 870, 881, 885, cert. denied.
Affirming the lower court's action, the Supreme Court of 361 U.S. 895 (1959) (Brink's robbery case) ("The
Vermont stated: "[T]he test is not whether the irregu- judge... was in a better position than we to evaluate
larity actually influenced the result, but whether it had the effect of publicity at that time."); Hagans v. State,
the capacity of prejudicing the verdict.. .. Indeed, the 372 S.W.2d 946, 948 (Tex. Ct. Crim. App. 1962), cert.
human mind often may be unaware of what factors in- denied, 375 U.S. 957 (1963), rehearing denied, 375 U.S.
fluenced its judgment in a given situation." Id. at 414, 989 (1964).
190 A.2d at 699.
The trial judge's discretion extends to his disposition
In Sheppard v. Maxwell, 231 F. Supp. 37 (S.D. Ohio of motions for any remedies available to a defendant
1964), the district court granted habeas corpus to Ohio against prejudiced jurors, since the granting of such
state prisoner Dr. Sam Sheppard, stating, "[Tihe pre- motions presupposes a finding of partiality. See notes
judicial effect of the newspaper publicity was so mani- 68-81 infra and accompanying text. Moreover, since
fest that no jury could have been seated at that particu- mandamus will not lie to compel performance of dislar time in Cleveland which would have been fair and cretionary acts. this writ is generally not available to
impartial .... "Id. at 60.
compel the granting of such trial level reliefs. See, e.g.,
16345 Mass. 609, 188 N.E.2d 923 (1963).
Hoffa v. Gray, supra. But see State v. Thompson, 123
17,373 U.S. 723 (1963).
N.W.2d 378 (Minn. 1963), where mandamus was
1b366 U.S. 717 (1961).
granted to compel change of venue.
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quirement. Within this framework, the publicity
with which we should be concerned is publicity
which, if read or heard by potential or actual
jurors, may reasonably be used by them in deciding the issue whether a criminal defendant is
guilty, and which might not be admitted as evidence at his trial. If jury members are exposed to
such material and the material is not eventually
admitted as evidence, then the defendant's right
to a fair trial will have been violated in that the
jury had the opportunity to consider matters not
presented in open court in determining his guilt.
For example, in Marshall v. United States,21 defendant was on trial for unlawfully dispensing
drugs in violation of a federal statute. Seven members of the jury admitted having read news articles
containing facts relating to defendant's prior convictions for practicing medicine without a license.
The trial court had held evidence of these convictions inadmissible on the ground that it was irrelevant to the issues in the case and would be
prejudicial to defendant. In the exercise of its
supervisory power over the lower federal courts,
the United States Supreme Court reversed Marshal's conviction, stating: "[The jurors were exposed] to information of a character which the
trial court ruled was so prejudicial it could not be
directly offered as evidence. The prejudice to the
defendant is almost certain to be as great when
that evidence reaches the jury through" news accounts as when it is a part of the prosecution's
evidence."2
On the other hand, where the text of defendant's
confession was published before trial, the United
States Supreme Court affirmed his state conviction
on the ground that since the confession was subsequently admitted in evidence, defendant was not
prejudiced by the publication.13 Moreover, where
a jury was exposed to publicity containing proffered testimony which the trial court had excluded
merely on grounds of irrelevance rather than because of its prejudicial nature, the Alaska Supreme
Court affirmed defendant's conviction.'
The case law follows the general test outlined
above-if material, read or heard by jurors, was
likely to influence their decision as to a defendant's
guilt, and if the material was not admitted as

evidence, then the material was prejudicial to that
defendant's right to a fair trial.
Six categories of material appear to meet this
general test: (1) Confessions; (2) Prior criminal
activities; (3) Incriminating tangible evidence;
(4) Statements of persons who may not actually
testify; (5) Reports of proceedings from which the
jury has been excluded; and (6) Miscellaneous
inflammatory material which may sway a jury's
sympathies against a defendant.
(1) Confessions. No defendant can be convicted
upon evidence which includes an involuntary con25
fession, regardless of the truth of the confession,
and regardless of independent evidence sufficient
to sustain his guilt. 26 Moreover, federal courts

must exclude certain voluntary cofessions as well,
if they resulted from prohibited official activity?
Since the jury must not consider the fact that a
defendant has confessed or the contents of his
confession unless and until that confession is held
admissible, a defendant whose purported confession
is published and then not admitted in evidence,
whether because not offered or because found inadmissible, is certain to be prejudiced by such
publication. Reports that a defendant has offered
or attempted to enter a plea of guilty or of nolo
Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534 (1961).
v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199 (1960); Spano
v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959); Payne v. Arkansas,
356 U.S. 560 (1958).
2 McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943), and
Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957) (viola25

26 Blackburn

tion of FED. R. Cm. P. 5(a), speedy arraignment);
Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963) (arrest
illegal by fourth amendment standards). Furthermore,
the states will most probably have to follow Wong Sun
under compulsion of the principle of Mapp v. Ohio, 367
U.S. 643 (1961), and thus exclude voluntary statements which resulted from (i.e., were "fruits" of) official action violative of due process. See, e.g., State v.
Mercurio, 194 A.2d 574 (R.I. 1963), where the Supreme
Court of Rhode Island applied the Wong Sun rule without discussion.
Moreover, state courts must now exclude incriminating pre-indictment statements made by a defendant
during a time when his right to counsel was being violated. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
28 See, e.g., Marshall v. United States, 360 U.S. 310
(1959); Shepherd v. Florida, 341 U.S. 50, 50 (1951)
(Jackson, J., concurring) (published confession never
offered as evidence); ef. People v. Bromme, 56 Cal. 2d
629, 636, 15 Cal. Rptr. 909, 913, 364 P.2d 845, 849
(1961) (published confession erroneously admitted).
In a poll of lawyers, police officials and newsmen.
taken by this writer, 41.94% of the 124 persons re21360 U.S. 310 (1959).
sponding cited publication of confessions as being the
kind of material most likely to be harmful to a criminal
Id. at 312.
2 Stroble v. California, 343 U.S. 181, 192 (1952).
defendant. See Table IX, in Part II of this article, and
2-Oxenberg v. State, 362 P.2d 893 (Alaska), cerl.the Explanatory Note to the appendices & tables in
denied. 368 U.S. 56 (1961).
Part II.
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contenderO 9 are tantamount to reports that he has
admitted guilt, and thus should be treated the
same as publicity concerning confessions. It would
be extremely naive to expect a juror who has read
or heard a statement referring to a defendant as a
"confessed killer," or has read or heard that a defendant has confessed or the purported contents of
his confession, to put this out of his mind merely
because no confession was admitted in evidence
and he was told to consider only evidence admitted in court.
That in many cases confessions are properly
admitted does not in any way vitiate the prejudice
suffered by the defendant whose confession, though
not admitted in evidence, was publicized. Nor can
the general pre-admission publication of confessions be justified by maintaining that it would
serve to relieve the public hysteria which often
follows an unsolved crime of violence, unless we are
willing to cite the desire for public complacency
as a rationale for the denial of a fundamental
constitutional right.3 0
(2) Prior criminal activities. Evidence of a defendant's alleged criminal activities unrelated to
the crime for which he is being tried is ordinarily
inadmissible in court.
"The state may not show defendant's prior
trouble with the law [or] specific criminal acts...
even though such facts might logically be persuasive that he is by propensity a probable
perpetrator of the crime. The inquiry is not rejected because character [as evidenced by prior
criminal activities] is irrelevant; on the contrary,
it is said to weigh too much with the jury and to
so overpersuade them as to prejudge one with
a bad general record and deny him a fair opportunity to defend against a particular charge."3u
Unless one of the few exceptions to this general
rule can be invoked, admission of such evidence
constitutes prejudicial, reversible error.n For ex29 See, e.g., Hammons v. People, 385 P.2d 592, 594
(Colo.
30 1963).
However, this desire may warrant such a rationale
in a31 truly exceptional case. See text in Section IX, infra.
Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 475-76
(1948).
1 Evidence of other crimes is inadmissible against a
defendant unless offered for certain specified purposes.
People v. Molineux, 168 N.Y. 264, 61 N.E. 286 (1901);
McCoxucx, EVIDENcE §157 (1954); Comment, Admitting Evidence of PriorSex Offenses-A New Trend,
58 Nw. U.L. Rxv. 108 (1963). Prior convictions are admissible only for purposes of impeachment. McCop.scx, EvIDENcE §43 (1954). In a few jurisdictions,
the fact that a defendant has been arrested, State v.
Christofaro, 70 R.I. 57, 37 A.2d 163 (1944), or indicted,
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ample, in a rather extreme holding, the Fourth
Circuit recently granted a state convict's petition
for habeas corpus on the ground that the jury's
improper knowledge of defendant's prior convictions in and of itself constituted a denial of his
federal constitutional right to a fair trial."
Since evidence of prior arrests, convictions, and
pending indictments and accusations of crimes unrelated to the offense charged are all likely to cause
the jury, probably through conscious or subconscious use of a "leopard never changes its spots"
thought process, to believe that defendant committed the crime charged, publication of such
material is reasonably certain to be prejudicial if
not later admitted.
(3) Incriminatingtangible evidence. No criminal
defendant can be convicted by means of evidence
obtained in violation of the constitutional prohibition against unreasonable search and seizure.1 If
the fact that incriminating tangible evidence has
been discovered is published in such a way that
the defendant is connected with the commission of
a crime, he will be prejudiced unless the evidence
is found to have been lawfully obtained and is
admitted against him at the trial. A defendant can
be equally prejudiced by such publicity concerning tangible evidence which may prove inadmissible by reason of some non-constitutional evidentiary rule.3 5 If, however, the discovery of
evidence is publicized without connecting any
State v. Goodwin, 29 Wash. 2d 276, 186 P.2d 935 (1947),
is admissible to impeach him; but by the general rule,
only prior convictions can so be used. Pearson v. United
States, 192 F.2d 681 (6th Cir. 1951). Admission of facts
concerning arrest for an offense other than that for
which defendant is presently on trial is prejudicial error.
Id. at 698. Even in a jurisdiction where evidence of
arrest or indictment is admissible for purposes of impeachment, publication of such facts pnor to the prosecution's opportunity to impeach defendant would be
prejudicial to defendant if he does not later testify.
For cases involving the publication of inadmissible
facts re criminal activities, see, e.g., Irvin v. Dowd, 366
U.S. 717 (1961); United States v. Accardo, 298 F.2d
133 (7th Cir. 1962); Gicinto v. United States, 212 F.2d
8 (8th Cir. 1954); Marson v. United States, 203 F.2d
904 (6th Cir. 1953); Rowley v. United States, 185 F.2d
523 (8th Cir. 1950); United States ex rel. Brown v.
Smith, 200 F. Supp. 385 (D. Vt. 1962); State v. Halko,
193 A.2d 817 (Del. 1963); Commonwealth v. Crehan,
345 Mass. 609, 188 N.E.2d 923 (1963); State v. LaRocca, 81 N.J. Super. 40, 194 A.2d 578 (App. Div.
1963); State v. Harris, 62 Wash. 2d 858, 863-65, 385
P.2d 18, 22-24 (1963). 32.26% of the persons responding to the writer's poll deemed publication of such information a type most likely to be harmful. See Table
IX, in Part II of this article.
3 Lane v. Warden, 320 F.2d 179 (4th Cir. 1963).
4 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
35See notes 99-101 and accompanying text.
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particular person to the crime, it is not prejudicial
to a defendant even if, for some reason, the evidence is not subsequently admitted. For example,
if police discover the "murder weapon," publication of that fact alone would not be prejudicial,
while publication of the fact that they found it in
the possession of the defendant would be.
(4) Statements of persons who may not actually
testify. Since every criminal defendant has a federal
constitutional right to be confronted by and to
cross-examine his accusers, 36 a defendant may be
prejudiced for inability to exercise this right if the
news media publish an extra-judicial statement
made by a person not subsequently called as a
witness against him. Such statements may independently tend to lead a juror to believe that the
defendant committed the crime charged, e.g.,
statements of "experts" regarding the results of
polygraph tests, ballistics tests, and other scientific
evidence, identification by "eye-witnesses," statements of official opinion that defendant is guilty,
statements which might not qualify as dying
declarations, and the like; or, such statements
could reasonably tend to discredit an accused's
possible defense without actually incriminating
him, e.g., statements impeaching the credibility of
defense witnesses, or indicating that a defendant
pleading insanity is actually sane.
(5) Reports of proceedingsfrom which thejury has
been excluded. Since a judge's exclusion of the jury
from a court proceeding is generally based on the
probability that the proceeding will contain information the jury is not entitled to know, publication of occurrences which take place during such
proceedings is very likely to be prejudicial to a
defendant. Most proceedings of this nature are
hearings at which the trial court rules on the admissibility of evidence or confessions. Only if and
when the evidence or confession is admitted can
the proceedings on which that determination was
based be published without probable prejudice to
the defendant."' U.S.. Cors. amend. VI, applicable to the states by
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 273 (1948). "[Due process requires] that no person shall be tried and convicted of an
offense unless he is... afforded an opportunity to
examine adverse witnesses." Williams v. New York,
337 U.S. 241, 245 (1949). See State v. Swenson, 62
Wash. 2d 259, 382 P.2d 614 (1963); Pettit v. Rhay,
62 Wash. 2d 515, 383 P.2d 889 (1963). 14.52% of the
persons responding considered publicity of this type
most likely to be harmful to a defendant. See Table IX,
in Part II of this article.
31See, e.g., Coppedge v. United States, 272 F.2d 504

(6) Miscellaneous inflammnatory material. Material in this category may consist of "human
interest" interviews with the victim or his family,
publication of the fact that a niurder victim's
estate is to be disposed of, editorials or factual
reports concerning a "crime wave," or reports of
the greater deterrent nature of capital punishment
as compared with prison sentences.n This type of
material tends to be inflammatory-that is, to
cause the jury to want to convict-and thus to be
prejudicial to whomever happens to be the defendant, not because he is any particular person about
whom publicity has been disseminated, but merely
because he is the defendant. For example, members
of the jury which found a defendant guilty of
murder and sentenced him to 299 years in prison
later admitted that they had been influenced by
articles concerning the then-pending proposed parole of Nathan Leopold. 39
It can be argued that, since material of the
kinds enumerated tends to disclose The Truth,
their publication should be encouraged. However,
even if a coerced confession is true, and even if
unconstitutionally seized evidence would conclusively establish a defendant's guilt, the United
States Constitution as interpreted by the United
States Supreme Court will permit no state or federal court in America to convict on such evidence.
While conceding that evidence of previous criminal
activities is not irrelevant and, in fact, is independently probative of present guilt, courts generally refuse to admit such evidence because of its
extremely prejudicial nature. Surely only a perverted form of justice would permit jurors to be
aware via news media of information which that
same justice forbids those jurors to take cognizance
of in open court.
III: ExIsTING METHODS
Accepting the above general definition of prejudicial publicity and tentative characterization of
specific kinds of material which may be prejudicial,
we must now examine the means which have been
(D.C. Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 855 (1961);
Bucher v. Krause, 200 F.2d 576 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
345 U.S. 997 (1952); People v. Lambright, 36 Cal.
Rptr. 851, 856-58 (Dist. Ct. App. 1964).
18See, e.g., People v. Purvis, 60 Cal. 2d 323, 332-42,
33 Cal. Rptr. 104, 110-16, 384 P.2d 424, 430-36 (1963).
11 Interview with Gerald Getty, Public Defender,
Cook County, Ill., April 16, 1962. See also State v.
Arrington, Mo. App. -,
375 S.W.2d 186
(1964) (publicity of case similar to defendant's); Ex
parle Pineda, Tex. Crim. - , 373 S.W.2d 689
(1964) (adverse publicity re defendant's counsel).
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used in an attempt to prevent defendants from
being convicted by juries influenced by such ma-

proceedings before it even though that act did not
take place in or in the immediate vicinity of the

terial. In evaluating each method, its effect upon

court 2

each of the three co-existing interests-of the defendant, the government, and the news mediawill be considered.

Methods currently available to American courts
for the purpose of attempting to solve the free
press-fair trial dilemma are: (1) issuing contempt

citations against those responsible for publication
of prejudicial information; (2) granting of trial
level procedural reliefs designed to prevent a biased

jury from rendering a verdict; (3) use of cautionary instructions to prevent or erase the harmful
effects of prejudicial publicity; and (4) reversing

convictions resulting from trials unfair because of
prejudicial publicity.

.

Perhaps the reason for rejection of this concept is
that constructive contempt is almost invariably
committed by publication,43 and its exercise is regarded by the press, radio, and television" as violative of the federal constitutional guarantee that
neither federal nor state action may abridge free45
dom of speech and of the press. While freedom of
the press protects almost absolutely against prior
restraint,"4

2
4 GOLDFARB, op. cit. supra note 40, at 77-89; Su-ivAN, CoNTxrs By PUBLiCATiON 6 (2d ed. 1940);
Goldfarb, Ensuring Fair Trials: The Impropriety of

Publicity,The New Republic, Feb. 29, 1964, p. 11.
. 41

(1) Contempt citations

Contempt citations against those responsible for
the publication of prejudicial information have
been little used by American courts because of

their general reluctance to apply the doctrine of
40
constructive contempt. Used with much success
in Great Britian," this doctrine allows a court to
punish as contempt any act which interferes with

40E.g., Nye v. United States, 313 U.S. 33 (1941),

overruling Toledo Newspaper Co. v. United States, 247

U.S. 403 (1918), construed 28 U.S.C. §385 to cover, as
punishable contempts, only acts committed in the
court's immediate presence or so geographically near
thereto as to obstruct the orderly administration of
justice. Accord, Rees v. United States, 293 F. Supp. 864
(D. Md. 1961), construing 18 U.S.C. §401 (1958). See

the government may take corrective

action to punish past misconduct--such as issuing

Contempts by publication have as a matter of

custom been called constructive contempts, and the
term is almost one of special connotation. Non-direct
contempts other than press contempt cases, such as attempted bribery of a witness or juror, are referred to as
indirect contempts. GomFAr.B, op. cit. supra note 40,
at 69.
"The first amendment's express guarantee of freedom of speech and of the press has been construed to
extend to radio, Baltimore Radio Show v. State, 193
Md. 300, 67 A.2d 497 (1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 912
(1950), and motion pictures, Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v.
Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952), and most certainly, therefore, extends to television, as well, though no case regarding television has come to the writer's attention.
45Federal: U.S. CONST. amend. I. State: "[Lliberty of
the press and of speech is within the liberty safeguarded
by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from invasion by state action ....

."

Near v.

Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 707 (1931); see also id. at
716-20. Accord, Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 160
(1939); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 362, 372
generally GoLFARB, TnE CONTEMPT PoWER 89-100
(1927) (concurring opinion); Gitlow v. New York, 268
(1963); Nelles & King, Contempt by Publication, 20
Couxx. L. Rxv. 525, 530 (1928). See also McGuigan, U.S. 652, 666 (1925) (leading case). "
46"[Tihe protection even as to prior restraint is not
Crime Reporting: The British and American Approaches,
absolutely unlimited. But the limitation has been recog50 A.B.A.J. 442 (1964). But narrow construction of a
nized only in exceptional cases." Near v. Minnesota,
statutory contempt power may not affect the court's inherent contempt power. See, e.g., In re Simmons, 248 supra note 45, at 716. Accord, Patterson v. Colorado,
205 U.S. 454, 462 (1907). But see Times Film Corp. v.
Mich. 297, 300-01, 226 N.W. 907, 908 (1929).
41 See Speiser, Trial Topics, The Ward Trial and the
City of Chicago, 365 U.S. 43 (1961), which indicates
Press, 68 Case & Com. 12 (Nov.-Dec. 1963). Only the that prior restraint of motion pictures in nonexcepfact of arrest and matters concerning pre-trial pro- tional cases is not unconstitutional per se, and may be
cedure can be published before conclusion of the trial. unobjectionable if definite standards and fair purcedures are employed. For the view that freedom of the
See generally Baltimore Radio Show v. Maryland, 338
U.S. 912, 921-36 (1950) (appendix to opinion of Frank- press prohibits only prior restraint, see Sur.lvAN, CONTEMPTS By P BiCATION 165 (2d ed. 1940); StouLrvAN,
furter, J., respecting denial of certiorari); Pennekamp
v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 357 (1946) (Frankfurter, J.,

concurring); Singer v. State, 109 So. 2d 7, 15 (Fla. 1959);

Goodhart, Newspapers and Contempt of Court in English
Law, 48 HARv. L. REv. 885 (1935); Laski, Procedure
for Constructive Contempt in England, 41 HARV. L. REv.
1031 (1928). In response to the question what kinds of
material are most likely to harm a criminal defendant,
25% of the persons responding in effect stated that only
such matters as can be published under the English
system are not likely to be harmful if published before
admission as evidence at the trial. See Table IV, in Part
II of this article.

TRIAL By NEWSPAPER 245-46 (1961).
In the Near case, supra, the Court held that a statute
which deemed any publication of a defamatory or

malicious nature a nuisance was an unconstitutional

abridgement of freedom of speech and of the press. The

crux of the decision was that the statute, although pur-

portedly describing a corrective process, operated in
such a way as to amount to prior restraint, inasmuch as
a violation of the injunction against the nuisance was

punishable as a criminal contempt. Four Justices dissented on the ground that the statute was not a prior
restraint.

1951
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a contempt dtation4-if, under the circumstances,
the words uttered or published create a "clear and
present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress [or the state] has a
right to prevent."43 Interference with the fair administration of justice, such as by publication of
material which presents a clear and present danger
to the fairness of a particular trial, is an evil which
the government has a right to prevent. Freedom of
the press has been held subject to restriction where
there was a clear and present danger that its exercise
would cause serious political, economic, or moral
injury to the government, 49 would impede the
performance of governmental duties,0 or would
endanger the foundations of organized government. -1 A fair judicial system surely is one of the
foundations of our government, and maintenance
of such a system a governmental duty. The United
States Supreme Court has expressly recognized
"the conceded authority of courts to punish for
contempt when publications directly tend to prevent the proper discharge of judicial functions."12
The Supreme Court, though, has never affirmed
a contempt citation issued for a contempt committed by publication. However, in reversing three
cases in which newspapers had been held in contempt for the publication of prejudicial material,m
the Court based its decisions not on the per se
invalidity of holding newspapers in contempt, but
rather on the absence of a "clear and present
danger" to the orderly administration of the judicial process in the cases in question. It should be
noted that these three cases were not tried before
47

Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 290 (1941)

(Frankfurter, J., dissenting); Consensus of Reform of
Sensational Reporting, 20 J. Am. Jim. Soc'y 83, 84

(1936) (quoting from Address by Frank J. Hogan).
Although citing for contempt is, as a matter of form, a
corrective process, the United States Supreme Court
has indicated that, in effect, such process may amount
to unconstitutional prior censorship.
"[The question is to what extent the judgments of
contempt] as a practical matter ... would affect the
liberty of expression.... [A]nyone who might wish
to give public expression to his views on a pending
case.., would be as effectively discouraged as if a
deliberate statutory scheme of censorship had been
adopted."
Bridges v. California, supra : t 268-69 (majority
opinion).
8 Schenck v. Uaited States, 249 U.S. 47, 51 (1919).
49Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 373 (1927)
(concurring opinion of Brandeis, ).
60Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S 652, 667 (1925).
51Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 371 (1927).
62Near v. Min, -sota, 283 U.S. 679, 715 (1931).
" Craig v. Har.,ey, 331 U.S. 367 (1947); Pennekamp
v. Florida, 328 U S. 331 (1946); Bridges v. California,
314 U.S. 252 (19,).

juries. It has been suggested that the danger of
impeding the judicial process via prejudicial publications is substantially lessened where the case is
tried by a judge, a law-trained mimn regarded as
capable of being objective, rather than before a
jury of impressionable laymen.M In Wood v. Georgia,55 a recent contempt by publication case involving publication of a sheriff's statements designed to influence a grand jury, the United States
Supreme Court reversed for lack of a clear and
present danger, noting that the instant case did not
involve a criminal trial pending before a jury.56
This dictum indicates that, presented the proper
case of dissemination of prejudicial material regarding a criminal case pending before a jury, the
Supreme Court would affirm a contempt conviction.
The purpose of freedom of the press is to "assure
unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing
about of social changes desired by the people,"n7
and this right thus is essential to our system of
government. Arguably, only publications consistent with the legitimate purpose of freedom of the
press are entitled to its full protection., In an
analogous situation, freedom of the press does not
extend to confidential government documents, 9
since disclosure to the press of secret government
information could seriously undermine the ability
of the various branches of government in discharging their consfitutionally defined responsibilities.69
5 Cf. United States v. Rees, 193 F. Supp. 861, 863
(D. Md. 1961).
656 370 U.S. 375 (1962).
1 Id.
57

at 389-90.
Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957).
"The importance of this [freedom of the press] con-

sists... in its diffusion of liberal sentiments on the

administration of Government, its ready communication of thoughts, between subjects, and its consequential promotion of union among them, whereby
oppressive officers are shamed or intimidated, into

more honourable and just modes of conducting
affairs."3
Ibid. [Citing 1 JouRAs oF =x CONTNXNFAL CON-

GREss 108 (1774).1
" "Because freedom of public expression alone assures the unfolding of truth, it is indispensible to the
democratic process." Bridges v. California, 314 U.S.
252, 293 (1941) (dissenting opinion of Frankfurter, J.).

It is interesting to note that Mr. Justice Frankfurter,

eloquently though he may extoll the necessity of freedom of the press, as in the above quotation, recognizes
that this freedom must not be exercised in a manner
inconsistent with the fair administration cf the judicial system. See, e.g., quotation in text at note 61 infra.
9 See, e.g., Trimble v. Johnston, 173 F. Supp. 651
(D.D.C. 1959).
&Old. at 656. See Will, Free Press vs. Fair Trial, 12

DEPAUL L. Rxv. 197, 200-01 (1963). Cohen, A Frec

CAROLYN JAFFE

Use of the freedom of the press which results in the
denial of a defendant's right to a fair trial and
prejudices the outcome of a criminal case seems a
perverted exercise of that right, and repugnant to
its purpose. For example, consider Mr. Justice
Frankfurter's pointed observation:
"In securing freedom of speech, the Constitution
hardly meant to create the right to influence
judges or juries. That is no more freedom of
speech than stuffing a ballot box is an exericse
of the right to vote." 6'
The fair comment which serves the purpose of
freedom of the press does not include material
published with the intent to influence the result of
a criminal trial.u Moreover, material published
without such intent but nonetheless reasonably
certain to have that incidental effect constitutes a
"dear and present danger" under a fair interpretation of that test, since the danger lies in the
probable effect of publication.u
Use of the contempt power to punish a contempt
committed by publication of prejudicial material
would seem to be -constitutional so long as the
clear and present danger test was met, because the
action would not impose prior restraint, and the
publication would be of a nature inconsistent with
the purpose of freedom of the press.5 '
Another reason for judicial reluctance to exercise
the inherent contempt power may rest upon the
position of most of our judges as elected officials
Press Vs. Fair Trial, Chicago Sun-Times, July 5, 1964,

sec. 2, p. 3.
" Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 366 (1946)
(concurring opinion of Frankfurter, J.).
82 See Craig v. Hecht, 263 U.S. 255, 278 (1923)
(concurring opinion of Taft, C.J.). Cf. Craig v. Harney,
331 U.S. 367, 376-77 (1947); Pennekamp v. Florida,
328 U.S. 331, 348 (1946); id. at 365 (concurring opinion
of Frankfurter, J.); SuLiVAN, CoNrEmaps By PUBLICATION 176 (2d ed. 1940); SuLLrVAN, TRIAL By N wsPAPER 211-24 (1961).

63See Baltimore Radio Show v. State, 193 Md. 300,
331, 61 A.2d 497, 511 (1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 912
(1950), where the Maryland Court indicates that material published or broadcast without intent to influence
the result could constitute a "clear and present danger."
Cf. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919)
(espionage), where pamphlets intended to aid the Russian Revolution, but necessarily having the incidental
effect of harming the United States' war effort, were
held to constitute a punishable "clear and present
danger."
" Cf. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957)
(freedom of speech does not protect obscenity). 41.94%
of the persons responding thought the contempt power
could be used. Of those responding that it could not,
only 40.68% based their answer on grounds of unconstitutionality. See Tables I & III, in Part II of this
article.
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dependent on the press for political support.6" A
further reason may be judicial ignorance that the
inherent contempt power extends beyond the
power to cite for contempt those who scandalize
the court. 66
Although it is essential to our system of government that no person be convicted but by an impartial jury, it is just as essential that no organ of
public sentiment be effectively prohibited from
making fair comment on that government. Only
publications not constituting fair comment as defined above would be contemptuous, but limited
restrictions with fair and reasonable beginnings
may eventually compound into an oppressive
whole. Use of the contempt power may thus projectively undermine freedom of the press even if it
would not presently violate that freedom.
-Furthermore, what does it help a particular
convicted defendant that the newspaper which
helped to convict him has been held in contempt?
And future defendants will not be aided by present
contempt citations unless definitive standards of
contemptuous conduct are established; in absence
of such standards, punishment for contempt lacks
deterrent effect.Y The prosecuting government's
interests are also neglected by use of the contempt
65"The election of... judges for short terms obviously made them subservient to press requirements."
Editorial, Publicity Scandals Demand Eercise of Au-

thority, 20 J. Am. JuD. Soc'y 82, 83 (1936). "The reason
why... [the courts] fear the power of newspapers is
because that power is political power .... [T]he popular
election of judges for fixed terms is the greatest single
evil of our judicial system." Perry, The Courts, The
Press, and The Publi; 30 MIcH. L. REv. 228, 234
(1931). "[There is a widespread and firmly established
system of trading official information and official favor
for newspaperpublicity and newspaper influence.... It
is precisely and definitely from this system that the evil
of trial by newspaper derives." Id. at 233. Of the persons responding that the contempt power could not be
used, 23.73% based their answer on this political
reason. See Table IM, in Part II of this article.
6 SULLIVAN, CONTEmPTs
By PUBLICATION 126-30
(2d ed. 1940).
67Cf. In the Matter of Seed, 140 Misc. 681, 251
N.Y. Supp. 615 (Sup. Ct. 1931). The New York Supreme Court cited a news photographer for contempt
after having been advised that an explosion ensued at a
criminal trial when he attempted to take a photograph.
Finding Seed guilty of contempt but discharging him in
light of his lack of knowledge of the illegality of his conduct, the court stated:
"[This occurrence and similar ones] have been
brought about by a lack of knowledge on the part of
those seeking to obtain the pictures as to their rights
and... duties toward the court. This memorandum
is written with the thought that the information
therein contained will lead to a proper conduct on the
part of those seeking to take pictures in the vicinity
of the court."
Id. at 684, 251 N.Y. Supp. at 618.
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power, because so long as this process is not uniformly applied according to some standards, it
serves no deterrent function and thus does not
tend to help secure the effective enforcement of
justice in the long run.
(2) Trial level remedies
Various remedies designed to prevent a defendant from being tried by a prejudiced jury are
available at the trial level. Included are motions
for dismissal of a prospective' or impanelled 69
juror for cause, for declaration of mistrial 7 0 for
continuance,7 1 for change of venue,72 and for new
trial. Failure to grant the requested relief is re-

versible error only where a defendant has been
prejudiced thereby and where such failure amounts
to an abuse of discretion. 4 However, these remedies
fail to protect defendants' rights and the corollary
sovereign rights simply because they are so seldom
granted,751 probably due to the nebulous nature of
impartiality76 and the trial court's broad discretion
as to disposition of such motions. 7 Another reason
these procedures are ineffective is that, if granted,
such remedies as change of venue, continuance,
and even new trial, will be unable to assure a fair
trial if widespread and intense publicity concerning the trial continues to be disseminated.3 Even
7
4An appellate court will not overturn a trial court's
finding of impartiality unless error is so manifest as to
amount to an abuse of discretion, Holt v. United States,
218 U.S. 245, 248 (1910); Dillon v. United States, 218
F.2d 97, 103 (8th Cir. 1955); Singer v. State, 109 So.
2d 7, 13 (Fla. 1959), apparently because the trial judge
is presumed to be in a better position than is the appellate court to weigh all the factors in determining the
question of what effect, if any, publication of prejudicial
information has upon the fairness of a given trial. Commonwealth v. Geagan, 339 Mass. 487, 501, 508, 159
N.E.2d 870, 881, 885, cert. denied, 361 U.S. 895 (1959)
(Brinks' robbery case). Since determination of whether
or not to grant the various motions depends on a finding
of partiality or no partiality, appellate courts allow trial
courts that same broad discretion as to disposition of
the75motions.
Address by Mr. James R. Thompson, Assistant
States Attorney, Cook County, Ill., Conference on Prejudicial News Reporting in Criminal Cases, Northwestern Univ. School of Law, May 3, 1962, in Fr PRESs-

6s E.g., Hopt v. Utah, 120 U.S. 430 (1887); Reynolds
v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
0 E.g., United States v. Griffin, 176 F.2d 727 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 952 (1949); United States
v. Carruthers, 152 F.2d 512 (7th Cir. 1945), cert. denied,
32770U.S. 787 (1946).
E.g., Marshall v. United States, 360 U.S. 310
(1959); Copnedge v. United States, 272 F.2d 504 (D.C.
Cir. 1959), "cert. denied, 368 U.S. 855 (1961); State v.
Puckett, 92 Ariz. 407, 377 P.2d 779 (1963); Hammons
v. People, Colo. -,
385 P.2d 592 (1963); Commonwealth v. Crehan, 345 Mass. 609, 188 N.E.2d 923
(1963); People v. Genovese, 10 N.Y.2d 478, 180 N.E.2d
419, 225 N.Y.S.2d 34 (1963); State v. Harris, 62 Wash.
2d 858, 385 P.2d 18 (1963).
In State v. Puckett, supra, the trial court (sitting
without a jury) declared a mistrial sua sponte upon publication of an article declaring that the judge's decision
in the case would be politically influenced. Defendant FAIR TRIAL: A. R-aToR oP = PEocEEDiNGs or A
challenged retrial on double jeopardy grodnds. The CoNrE- cE oN PRE uDicrAL NEWS REPORTING IN
Arizona Supreme Court held that the new trial did not
CRsnaAL CASES 7, 12-15 (Inbau ed. 1964); Address by
constitute double jeopardy, inasmuch as the trial court
Mr. James R. Thompson, Second Annual Short Course
had71a "legal reason" for declaring the mistrial.
for Newsmen in Crime News Analysis and Reporting,
E.g., United States v. Holovachka, 314 F.2d 345, Northwestern Univ. School of Law, Summer 1960, in
349-53 (7th Cir. 1963); Delaney v. United States, 199 INBAU & SowLE, CamxmA JusTIcE 810, 813 (1960);
F.2d 107 (1st Cir. 1952); Perez v. State, 236 Ark. 921, Will, supra note 60, at 209 n.39.
76See notes 10-15 supra and accompanying text.
370 S.W.2d 613 (1963); State v. Hickock, 188 Kan.
473, 363 P.2d 541 (1961); State v. St. Peter, 63
77 See note 74 supra.
Wash. 2d 495, 387 P.2d 937 (1963).
78Furthermore, it has been suggested that the
12E.g., Rideau v. Louisiana 373 U.S. 723 (1963);
remedies of continuance and change of venue not only
Hoffa v. Gray, 323 F.2d 178 (6th Cir. 1963); United would be to no avail [Commonwealth v. Geagan, 339
States ex rel. Bloeth v. Denno,, 313 F.2d 364 (2d Cir. Mass. 487 501 159 N.E.2d 870, 881, cert. denied, 361
1963); Latham v. Crouse, 320 F.2d 120 (10th Cir. U.S. 895 (1959 , wherein the argument was advanced
1963); United States v. Kline, 221 F. Supp. 776 (D. that since the prejudice engendered was so strong and
Minn. 1963); People v. Magee, 217 Cal. App. 2d 443, widespread that no fair trial which properly could be
472-74, 31 Cal. Rptr. 658, 677-78 (1963), cert. denied, called "speedy" could be had anywhere in the Com376 U.S. 925, rehearing denied, 376 U.S. 967 (1964);
monwealth, defendants could never be constitutionally.
Singer v.. State, 109 So. 2d 7 (Fla. 1959); Blevins v. tried in Massachusetts], but also would entail waiver of
State, 108 Ga. App. 738, 134 S.E.2d 496 (1963);
the constitutional right to a speedy trial in the county
Morgan v. State, 211 Ga. 172, 84 S.E.2d 365 (1954);
where the alleged crime was committed. Address by
Nickell v. Commonwealth, 371 S.W.2d 849 (Ky. 1963);
Mr. James R. Thompson, Second Annual Short Course,
Smith v. Commonwealth, 366 S.W.2d 902. 903-04 supra note 75.
(Ky. 1962); State v. Thompson, Minn.._.._, 123
Of course, the perils of being tried by a biased jury
N.W.2d 378 (1963); State v. Odom, Mo. ., 369 would disappear if a defendant were to elect to be tried
S.W.2d 173 (1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 993 (1964);
by the court alone, assuming that judges are immune to
Hagans v. State, Tea. Crim. -,
-,
372 prejudice. But this constitutes waiver of the constituS.W.2d 946, 948 (1962), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 957 tional right to trial by jury. "A citizen should not be
(1963), rehearing denied, 375 U.S. 989 (1964); Crouse v. coerced to relinquish his right to a jury trial.., in
State, Wyo. -,..
384 P.2d 321, 331 (1963).
order to escape an intolerable situation of a trial before
73
E.g., Stroble v. California, 343 U.S. 181 (1952);
a prejudiced jury." Jones v. State, 185 Md. 481, 486,
State v. Halko, Del. -, 193 A.2d 817 (1963).
45 A.2d 350, 352 (1945).
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when granted, these motions have little tendency
to deter future publication of prejudicial material.
It would appear that the trial level technique
of sequestering the jury (i.e., keeping the jurors
"locked up" during the course of the trial) is the
most effective way to prevent the defendant's being
prejudiced by publicity appearing after the jury
has been impanelled. 79 This method has been infrequently employed, however, perhaps because of
a desire to avoid coercing the unhappily confined
jurors to concur in a hurried verdict. However in
a recent case the Seventh Circuit approved the
trial judge's sua sponte sequestration of the jury
for the purpose of protecting defendant from the
effects of prejudicial publicity over defendant's
contention that this action resulted in a coerced
verdict against him.80 Furthermore, sequestration
requires large expenditures by the state.81
(3) Cautionaryinstructions
Where the trial court instructs the jury not to
read or listen to accounts of the case which may
appear during the course of the trial8 or not to
consider any matters other than evidence presented
at the trial,V5 appellate courts generally presume
that the instructions were effective and thus find
no prejudice due to pre-trial publicity or publicity
appearing during the trial accordingly, failure to
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give cautionary instructions has been held to constitute reversible error.8 6
However, for several reasons, preventive cautionary instructions nonetheless fail to protect a
defendant's right to a fair trial and the sovereign's
right to preserve the orderly administration of
justice by giving him a fair trial. First, they cannot
protect against the possible effects of pre-trial
publicity, simply because of the time element.
Second, jurors may disregard preventive cautionary instructions and fail to admit it for fear of
reprisal by the court. For example, in Smith v.
United'States,86 a prejudicial article was published

after cautionary instructions had been given..
Upon defense counsel's request that despite the
instructions the jury be polled as to whether any
had read the article, the court addressed the jury
as a whole as follows: " 'fllf any juror violated the
instructions of the court and read the article...
hold up your hands.' ,,7 A better procedure involving the private interrogation of individual jurors
is outlined by Judge Kiley in United States v.
AccardoPs Third, these instructions may call to a
juror's attention articles which might otherwise
have gone unnoticed8 9 Corrective cautionary inis that the human mind is inexorably affected by impressions lodged in the subconscious. See note 90 infra.
86E.g., Preventive: United States v. Accardo, 298

F.2d 133, 136 (7th Cir. 1962) (general preventive cautionary instructions inadequate); Coppedge v. United
79E.g., in the recent Hoffa criminal fraud trial, Judge
States, 272 F.2d 504, 507-08 (D.C. Cir. 1959), cert.
Richard B. Austin, N.D. Ill., sequestered the jury. In denied, 368 U.S. 855 (1961) (trial court under duty to
this case, however, the reason for sequestration appears give preventive cautionary instructions); Carter v.
to have been not only to insulate against the effects of United States, 252 F.2d 608 (D.C. Cir. 1956) (failure to
prejudicial publicity but also to prevent interests give preventive cautionary instruction reversible error
representing the defendant from contacting jurors for
though actual prejudice Isee note 13 supra] not shown);
the purpose of threatening or bribing them.
Delaney v. United States, 199 F.2d 107 (1st Cir. 1952)
80 United States v. Holovachka, 314 F.2d 345, 349(failure to give preventive cautionary instructions
53 (7th Cir. 1963).
rendered subsequent corrective cautionary instructions
st See Will, supra note 60, at 209 n.39.
ineffective); Briggs v. United States, 221 F.2d 636
82 Termed preventive cautionary instructions.
(6th Cir. 1955) (publication during trial, no request by
8 Termed corrective cautionary instructions.
defendant for instruction); Corrective: King v. United
SE.g., Preventive: Smith v. United States, 236 F.2d
States, 25 F.2d 242, 244 (6th Cir. 1928) (trial court
.260 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 909 (1956); Correc- under duty to give cautionary instructions when articles
tive: United States v. Leviton, 193 F.2d 848, 857 (2d appear); People v. Purvis, 60 Cal. 2d. 323, 332-42, 33
Cir. 1951) (article found in jury room, corrective cauCal. Rptr. 104, 110-16, 384 P.2d 424, 430-36 (1963)
tionary instructions presumed effective); United States (trial court's failure to give specific corrective cautionv. Griffin, 176 F.2d 727 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. ary instruction amounted to approval of prosecutor's
952 (1949) (no proof that any juror read article); argument re prejudicial publicity).
86 236 F.2d 260 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 909
United States v. Carruthers, 152 F.2d 512 (7th Cir.
1945), cert. denied, 327 U.S. 787 (1946) (one juror saw (1956), rehearing denied, 353 U.S. 989 (1957).
article, but no proof of prejudice); Hammons v. People,
87 Id. at 269-70.
385 P.2d 592, 594-95 (Colo. 1963) (general corrective
88 298 F.2d 133, 136 (7th Cir. 1962).
cautionary instruction presumed effective to cure any
11See Briggs v. United States, 221 F.2d 636, 639
prejudice caused by news report of defendant's offer to (6th Cir. 1955); Marson v. United States, 203 F.2d 904,
plead nolo contendere); State v. Cox, 188 Kan. 500, 501, 909 (6th Cir. 1953). Judge Julius J. Hoffman, N.D. Ill.,
363 P.2d 528, 529 (1963) (corrective cautionary instruc- has told the writer that subsequent to decision of the
tion presumed to have cured prejudicial effects of radio Accardo appeal, supra note 88, which in effect requires
broadcast); Commonwealth v. Crehan, 345 Mass. 609. district judges in the Seventh Circuit to give preventive
188 N.E.2d 923 (1963) (general corrective cautionary cautionary instructions before every recess, a number of
instruction ineffective to cure prejudice).
defense attorneys have waived the right to such inHowever, current thinking in the behavioral sciences structions, specifically requesting that they not be
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z-tructions are likely to be ineffective for the third
reason above, and also because of the difficulty, if
not impossibility, for a juror not to be at least
subconsciously influenced by extra-judicial matters to which he was exposed despite honest efforts
to remain fair and impartial and to discharge his
oath. 0
Exposure to extra-judicial matters not in evidence at the trial may cause a juror subconsciously
to resolve disputed issues of fact against the defendant even though that juror is not in fact deciding defendant's guilt on the basis of consciously
considered facts gained other than at the trial.
Moreover, extra-judicial exposure to matters which
are subsequently admitted in evidence may lead a
sincere juror to resolve disputed issues of fact, and,
perhaps more importantly, issues of credibility of
witnesses, against defendant. The pre-admission
exposure may well cause a juror to give more
weight to the evidence than he would if his first
and only contact with the matter were as evidence
in court.
(4) Reversal of Convictions

Many factors are considered by reviewing courts
in determining whether a judgment of conviction
should be overturned on prejudicial publicity
grounds. Invariably the reversible error alleged by
appellant will be denial of a fair trial occasioned
by the trial court's failure or refusal to grant trial
level remedies or cautionary instructions. Hence,
the issues reviewing courts discuss tend to establish
the p;esence or absence of prejudice.
State or Federal Convicting Court. The question
whether the conviction was rendered in a state or
federal court is peculiar to the federal courts, since
given so that the jurors will not be curious to read
what they would have been warned against.
90See note 11 supra and acc6mpanying text. It should
be noted that, even though one may not be consciously
influenced by prior exposure to prejudicial publicity in
the task of arriving at a verdict, he may in fact be unable to put the extra-judicially acquired material out of
his mind and' thus may subconsciously utilize it in
reaching his verdict while sincerely believing that he is
deciding 'the case objectively and "solely on the basis
of the evidence presented in court." For discussion of
the subtle machinations of prior experience, see, e.g.,
KRECH & CRUTCHFIELD, THEORY AND PROBLEMS OF
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 87 (1948); TOLMAN, PuRposIvE

394 (1932); Siipola, A
Study of Some E17ects of PreparatorySet, in HARTLEY,
OtrrsmE READINGS IN PSYCHOLOGY 266-75 (1950);
BEHAVIOR IN ANmLs AND MEN

WICKENS & MEYER, PSYCHOLOGY 276-85 (1961);
Eckstrand & Wickens, Transfer of PerceptualSet, 47 J.
EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY 274 (1954). See also Comment, Prejudice and the Administratire Process, 59

Nw. U.L. REv. 216 (1964).

only a federal court can hear cases which originate
in both federal and state courts.0 ' If the conviction
was rendered in a federal court, the United States
Supreme Court can reverse in exercise of its general
supervisory power over the lower federal courts. 92
When a federal court is reviewing a state conviction, however, habeas corpus can be granted 93 or
reversal ordered94 only if the defendant was denied
a fair trial in violation of due process.9 - However,
9
the fact that the 1963 case of Rideau v. Louisiana 6
allowed speculative proof of prejudice to establish
that the constitutionally compelled impartiality
requirement was not met by the state jury indicates that the state-federal distinction will seldom
be meaningful in cases to come.
Admissibility of Information Complained of.
Publicity relating facts unfavorable to a defendant
which are inadmissible as evidence at the trial is
very likely to be prejudicial, since a juror who
reads such publicity will have been exposed to
evidence not introduced at the trial, and might
consider such facts in his deliberations.9 Con91 For example, a federal district court may review a
state conviction in a habeas corpus proceeding, and a
federal appellate court may review a district court's
decision on a habeas petition. The United States
Supreme Court may have occasion to review a state
conviction directly.
92 See, e.g., Marshall v. United States, 360 U.S. 310
(1959). The Court reversed and granted a new trial in
exercise of its "supervisory power to formulate and
apply proper stkndards for enforcement of the criminal
law in the federal courts." Id. at 313. Although such
supervisory power is initially exercised to correct prejudicial error, application of rules so formulated may result in reversal where a defendant was not in fact prejudiced, but where such circumstances as were present at
his trial may, in other cases, result in prejudice.
91Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961), United States
ex rel. Bloeth v. Denno, 313 F.2d 364 (2d Cir. 1963),
Sheppard v. Maxwell, 231 F. Supp. 37 (S.D. Ohio 1964),
and United States ex ret. Smith v. Brown, 200 F. Supp.
885 (D. Vt. 1962), appear to be the only cases to date
wherein federal habeas corpus issued to a state prisoner
on 9this
ground.
4
Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723 (1963), the
Supreme Court's latest state prejudicial publicity case,
came up on certiorari.
15Our "dual sovereignty" system of federalism, based.
on the tenth amendment, permits a federal court to
overturn a state conviction only if it was obtained in a
manner repugnant to the defendant's federal constitutional rights.
11Supra note 94. See note 17 supra and accompanying text.
97Mashall v. United States, 360 U.S. 310, 312 (1959)
(seven jurors saw articles re fact of prior convictions,
previously held inadmissible at trial-rev'd); Shepherd
v. Florida, 341 U.S. 50 (1951) (rev'd per curiam on
other grounds) (concurring opinion of Jackson, J.)
(article stated defendants had confessed; no confessions offered as evidence); United States v. Accardo, 298
F.2d 133 (7th Cir. 1962) (publication of inadmissible
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versely, if information published prior to trial is
subsequently admitted, defendant cannot successfully allege that the publicity prejudiced his
rights 9 The rule in the federal courts, controlled
by Marshall v.United States,99 requires reversal
where the jury was extra-judicially aware of information inadmissible because of its prejudicial nature,100 not simply because of some evidentiary
0
rule.' '
evidence re criminal activities-rev'd); Delaney v.
United States, 199 F.2d 107 (1st Cir. 1952) (publication
of inadmissible evidence-rev'd); People v. Purvis, 60
Cal. 2d 323,332-42,33 Cal. Rptr. 104,110-16,384 P. 2d
424, 430-36 (1963) (publication of inflammatory, inadmissible information re capital punishment-rev'd);
Commonwealth v. Crehan, 345 Mass. 609, 188 N.E.2d
923 (Mass. 1963) (publication by three major local
newspapers of fact that trial judge requested them not
to print defendants' criminal records-rev'd).
9sStroble v. California, 343 U.S. 181, 192 (1952)
(text of confesion published before trial, confession
latcr admitted as evidence-aff'd); United States v.
Kline, 221 F. Supp. 776 (D. Minn. 1963) (publicity
circulated during trial contained no material not eventually admitted as evidence-motions for new trial or
for acquittal denied).
It may be argued nevertheless that a prejudicial effect
existed. Even if the contents (substance) of the publicity were later admitted in evidence, it would appear
that a defendant could still be prejudiced, inasmuch as
a jury might well be more likely to believe the prosecution's evidence after having been conditioned to it by
the pre-trial publicity. See note 90 supra. Even if
jurors follow instructions not to read material about the
case, this cannot erase the effects of impressions formed
derived from exposure to pre-trial publicity. See notes
82-90 supa and accompanying text.
The elusive nature of impartiality renders even the
factor of subsequent admission of the evidence inconclusive, since the fact that evidence inadmissible because of its prejudicial nature was perceived by the jury
does not technically render a trial
unfair unless the jury
is found partial under the particular test of impartiality
applied. For example, where all jurors, upon interrogation by the trial court, stated that they had not been
prejudiced against defendant by a news article published during the trial referring to him as an "ex-convict," the court's finding of no prejudice was affirmed in
Rowley v. United States, 185 F.2d 523 (8th Cir. 1950).
A conviction was affirmed for lack of a finding of partiality where there was no proof that any juror had read
an article published during the trial which contained
the fact of defendant's pending trial for another offense,
and where a cautionary instruction had been given admonishing the jury to consider only evidence admitted
at the trial. United States v. Griffin, 176 F.2d 727 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 952 (1950).
99360 U.S. 310 (1959). See text accompanying notes
21 & 22 supra.
100
The crux of the Marshalldecision is that the jurors
were exposed to "information of a character which the
trial judge ruled was so prejudicial it could not be directly offered as evidence." Id. at 312.
Relying on Marshall, the Court of Appeals in Coppedge v. United States, 272 F.2d 504 (D.C. Cir. 1959),
cert. denied, 368 U.S. 855 (1961), reversed a conviction
handed down by a jury which might have read articles
containing accounts of transactions which occurred in
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Time Between Publicationand Trial. Although it
is difficult to measure so subjective a thing as impartiality-admittedly a state of mind-on an objective scale, some courts have attempted to do so.
If a relatively long period of time has elapsed between publication of the material complained of
and time of trial, a reviewing court is not likely to
find prejudice.'t
Action Taken by Defense Counsel Prior to or
During Trial. If defense counsel fails to move the
court to interrogate the prospective jurors on voir
dire, or the impanelled jurors during the trial, as
to whether they read the articles complained of,
and if so whether they were prejudiced thereby,
court during the jury's absence. These included statements made by an accomplice witness to the effect that
he was in mortal fear of defendant, and that defendant
had pistol-whipped the witness's brother. The Court of
Appeals stated, "These articles.. . contained additional
facts... which the jurors were not entitled to know...
and which were devastating to... [defendant's] cause."
Id. at 508. See United States v. Accardo, 298 F.2d 133
(7th Cir. 1962).
In Oxenberg v. State, 362 P.2d 893 (Alaska), cert.
denied, 368 U.S. 56 (1961), the Supreme Court of
Alaska affirmed denial of defendant's motion for mistrial, although the material complained of consisted of
testimony which had been excluded by the trial court.
Choosing to apply the Marshall rule, the court distintinguished Marshall on the ground that the excluded
testimony in the instant case was inadmissible because
of irrelevancy, not because of its prejudicial nature. The
court stated: "If the conversation had not been excluded, it would have amounted to... additional corroborative evidence of the same general type that was
admissible and had been introduced." Id. at 899.
101Under the Marshall rule, evidence which is incidentally prejudicial to the defendant but held inadmissible because of some evidentiary rule (e.g., hearsay,
irrelevancy, etc.), would probably be treated as if it had
been excluded by reason of its prejudicial nature, inasmuch as the effect of the material, not the stated reason
for its inadmissibility as evidence, determines whether
or not a defendant was in fact prejudiced by its publication.
i0 Beck v. Washington, 369 U.S. 541 (1962), affirming 298 F.2d 622 (9th Cir. 1962) (10 months); Stroble v.
California, 343 U.S. 181, 192 (1952) (6 weeks); United
States v. Kline, 221 F. Supp. 776 (D. Minn. 1963) (2
years); Commonwealth v. Geagan, 339 Mass. 487, 501,
159 N.E.2d 870, 881, cert. denied, 361 U.S. 895 (1959)
(4-5 months). The rationale seems to be: the longer the
lapse of time, the less the likelihood that an atmosphere
of prejudice still prevails. Some defense lawyers share
this opinion that in all but exceptional cases, the passage
of time doeshave this effect. Interview With Mr. Gerald
Getty, Public Defender, Cook County, Ill., April 16,
1962. It may be, however, that the objective yardstick
is of no practical value, for prejudice may not die a
natural death with the passage of time-especially in a
case which has received widespread publicity. See note
78 supra and accompanying text. For an example of a
case in which the persisting atmosphere of prejudice
was overwhelming, see Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S.
86 (1923).

THE PRESS AND THE OPPRESSED

most reviewing courts will not disturb the result.'01
It has been recognized, however, that such questioning may be harmful to a defendant's cause.
4
For example, in Briggs v. United States,'0 defendant moved for a mistrial, but declined to accept
the trial court's offer to interrogate the jury. Reversing the conviction rendered after the trial
court refused to declare a mistrial, the Sixth Circuit
stated, "It could very well be that questioning the
jury would be more prejudicial than helpful. We
do not believe that appellant was required to agree
to such questioning in order to preserve his contention that [he] was entitled to a mistrial." 05 In another case,0 6 defense counsel suggested voir dire
questions designed to elicit the existence of prejudice without alerting jurors to prejudicial material.
The trial court's insistence on asking questions in
such a form as to make the jurors aware of the
material constituted one ground for reversal.is?
103 E.g., Ferrari v. United States, 244 F.2d 132, 138
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 873 (1957) (failure to
interrogate on voir dire re pre-trial publicity); Gicinto
denied, 348
v. United States, 212 F.2d 8 (8th Cir.), cert.
U.S. 884 (1954) (failure to move court to interrogate re
publicity printed during trial); Bucher v. Krause, 200
F.2d 576, 583-84 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 997,
rehearingdenied, 346 U.S. 842 (1953) (failure to take
advantage of opportunity further to interrogate impanelled jurors re publicity during trial); State v.
fickok, 188 Kan. 473 484-85, 363 P.2d 541, 549
(1961) (no attempt to show prejudice either before or
during trial).
This rule is a logical corollary to the rule that actual
prejudice must be shown (see notes 13 & 14 supra and
accompanyifig text), for without the record of the results of such interrogation, a reviewing court following
this rule can have no basis for a finding of actual prejudice. Those courts which adhere to the view that only
speculative prejudice need be shown (see notes 15-18
supra and accompanying text) do not require interrogation as a procedural prerequisite to a finding of prejudice on review. Ser., e.g., Briggs v. United States, 221
F.2d 636 /6th Cir. 1955). This rule is just as logical a
corollary to the speculative prejudice rule, for if the circumstances raise the presumption of prejudice, the reviewing court must find prejudice if the presumption is
not rebutted. Moreover, since the speculative prejudice
rule does not rely on jurors' answers to questions regarding their bias or prejudice, absence of answers to
such questions does not impair operation of the rule.
I" Supra note 103.
1i5 Id.at 639.
116
Marson v. United States, 203 F.2d 904 (6th Cir.
1953).
107 "[Tihe last thing counsel wished to suggest [to
prospective jurors during voir dire] was any connection of appellant with criminal activities. The

Court ...interrogating the jurors for the purpose

of insuring a fair trial for appellant, proceeded to
ask the very questions which appellant's counsel
were most emphatically insisting constituted
prejudice to his right to a fair trial."
Id. at 909. A case which illustrates the possibly disastrous effects of clums-" interrogation is Smith v.

Failure of a defendant to exhaust his peremptory
challenges, to challenge for cause, or to move for
continuance, change of venue, or mistrial, though
not usually precluding the appellate court from
deciding the issue of impartiality," may lead the
court to infer that the articles complained of did
not in fact generate such widespread and lasting
prejudice as the defendant would like the court to
believe. 109
Source and Intent of the Information. If the inUnited States, 236 F.2d 260 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 352
U.S. 909 (1956), rehearing denied, 353 U.S. 989 (1957),
discussed in the text accompanying notes 86 & 87
supra. See Note, 50 J. CRw. L., C. & P.S. 374, 381
(1960).
108In State v. LaRocca, 81 N.J. Super. 40, 194 A.2d
578 (App. Div. 1963), however, the court held that defendant's failure to exercise an available peremptory
challenge to an allegedly prejudiced juror who was not
challengeable for cause precluded his attempt to overturn the verdict on appeal, stating, "To do so would
render the voir dire meaningless." Id. at 44, 194 A.2d
at 580.
109The following language is indicative of the inductive reasoning typically practiced by many courts:
"Every juror who sat in the case was pronounced acceptable to the defendant by his counsel and this
could hardly have occurred if there had been any
impression in his mind that the jurymen had been
prejudicially affected by the objectionable publicat in...."
People v. Becker, 215 N.Y. 126, 152, 109 N.E. 127, 135
(1915).
"[D]efendants waived some of their peremptory challenges ... [so] we must assume that.., they were

able to obtain fair and impartial jurors who were not
biased or pr~judiced by reason of the news media
complained of."
State v. Hickock, 188 Kan. 473, 485, 363 P.2d 541, 550
(1961).
"[I]n an effort to determine whether there was public
hysteria or widespread community prejudice against
petitioner at the time of his trial, we think it significant that ... [his attorneys] saw no occasion to seek
a transfer of the action to another county on the
ground that prejudicial newspaper accounts had
made it impossible for petitioner to obtain a fair
trial in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County."
Stroble v. California, 343 U.S. 181, 194 (1952). Accord,
Beck v. Washington, 369 U.S. 541 (1962) (failure to
challenge petit jurors for cause implied trial court's
acceptance of their declarations of impartiality was correct); Latham v. Crouse, 320 F.2d 120 (10th Cir. 1963)
(failure to request more than one change of venue and.
to challenge for cause); Stunz v. United States, 27 F.
2d 575 (8th Cir. 1928) (failure to move for change of
venue); People v. Magee, 217 Cal. App. 2d 443, 472-73,
31 Cal. Rptr. 658, 677-78 (1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S.
925, rehearing denied, 376 U.S. 967 (1964) (failure to
move for change of venue); Gonzales v. State, 388 P.2d 312 (1964) (waiver of two
Okla. Crim. -,
peremptory challenges). Contra, Delaney v. United
States, 199 F.2d 107, 114 (1st Cir. 1952) (failure to
move for change of venue and to exhaust peremptory
challenges did not affect reviewing court's decision to
reverse on grounds of prejudice). See Note, 50 J. CSUm.
L., C. & P.S. 374, 378-81 (1960). But cf. note 78 supra
and accompanying text.
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formation contained in the publicity complained
of was instigated solely by the press, federal and
state reviewing courts have been less likely to reverse than if an agent of the prosecuting government was responsible for disseminationnO Indeed,
the "state action" concept of due process seems
especially applicable to support federally compelled
reversal of state convictions contaminated by publicity promulgated by an officer of the state."'
However, in Rideau -e. Louisiana,"2 where the
United States Supreme Court reversed defendant's
state murder conviction on prejudicial publicity
grounds, the Court expressly disclaimed reliance on
state action as to promulgation of the prejudicial
broadcasts, stating that, although it appeared that
local officials probably had prompted the filmed
interview, "the question of who originally initiated
'
the idea ...is... a basically irrelevant detail."1
The state action held by the Court to have deprived defendant of his federal rights was the state
trial court's refusal to grant his motions for change
of venue." 4 This notion utilized by the Rideau
I Federal:E.g., Stunz v. United States, 27 F.2d 575
(8th Cir. 1928). Affirming a conviction on the ground
that there was no abuse of discretion in the trial court's
denial of defendant's motion for continuance, the court
of appeals noted that "[Ilt is not claimed that the government in any way aided or encouraged these publications [purporting to outline the government's case]."
Id. at 577. See also Delaney v. United States, 199 F.2d
107 (1st Cir. 1952) (pre-trial publicity caused by congressional committee hearings-rev'd). State: E.g.,
People v. Becker, 215 N.Y. 126, 109 N.E. 127 (1915).
Although the court affirmed defendant's conviction, it
stated:
"The case would be quite different if the record disclosed any substantial foundation for the suggestion
that the district attorney or his agents were responsible in any way for any publications by which it was
sought to influence the outcome of the trial."
Id. at 152, 109 N.E. at 135.
m "To have the prosecutor himself feed the press
w.ith evidence that no self-restrained press ought to
p :blish in anticipation of a trial is to make the
SK.ite itself through the prosecutor, who wields its
power, a conscious participant in trial by newspaper, instead of by those methods [constituting
due process of law] which centuries of experience
have shown to be indispensible to the fair administration of justice."
Stroble v. California, 343 U.S. 181, 201 (1952) (dissenting opinion of Frankfurter, J.). See also Moore v.
Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86, 88 (1923) (inflammatory articles
designed to arouse public sentiment against Negroes
were promulgated by committee of state governorNegro defendants' convictions reversed); United States
ex rel. Brown v. Smith, 200 F. Supp. 885 (D. Vt. 1962)
(criminal record released to press by prosecutorhabeas corpus granted).
11 373 U.S. 723 (1963). See texa actcmpanying note
17 supra.
113373

U.S. at 726.
1 Ibid.
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court-that it is the prejudicial effect of an occurrence upon the defendant rather than the identity
or motive of the person who caused the event
which is the sole determinant of whether defendant's trial was fair,115 and that the trial court's
failure to cure the effects of the prejudicial occurrence constitutes "state action" for due process
purposesu 6-would seem to eradicate any previously persisting distinction between prosecutiongenerated publicity and publicity emanating from
other sources.
In short, reviewing courts are slow to reverse
convictions attacked on prejudicial publicity
grounds, mainly because it is extremely difficult,
as a practical matter, to prove prejudice. Even in
the case where the rights of a particular defendant
are vindicated by reversal of his conviction, this
method is an incomplete solution. Reversal of a
few convictions influenced by prejudicial publicity
will have little, if any, deterrent effect upon promulgation of like material in subsequent cases. 17
Further, the right of the prosecuting government
fairly to administer criminal justice and to protect
its citizens is entirely neglected by this "solution." ' Where the publicity which occasions reversal and remand emanates without participation
of any government official, the government has
been unjustly "punished"-by the trouble and expense of a new trial, or, if retrial is impossible as a
practical matter or because the appellate court
"I This concept recently has gained increasing acceptance among state courts. See, e.g., State v. Lea, 259
N.C. 398, 399, 130 S.E.2d 688, 689 (1963) ("[It is the
probable effect or influence upon the jury... and not
...[the judge's] motive, that determines whether the
right of the defendants to a fair trial has been impaired
.... "); People v. Roof, 216 Cal. App. 2d 222, 227,30
Cal. Rptr. 619, 622 (1963) ("It is the effect of the ...
statement, and not the motive behind it, which is
determinative of the question whether the case of defendant was substantially impaired."); People v.
Robertson, 12 N.Y.2d 355, 360, 190 N.E.2d 19, 21,
239 N.Y.S.2d 673, 677 (1963) ("The fault of... [one
who unintentionally gave false testimony] may be less
but the effect is the same .... ).
116Cf. DeLuna v. United States, 308 F.2d 140 (5th
Cir. 1962), where the trial court's failure to cure the
prejudicial effects of comment by co-defendant's counsel
upon defendant's failure to testify was held to amount
to governmental action. See especially language in id.
at 153-55.
1 See Will, Free Press vs. Fair Trial, 12 DEPAuL L.
Rxv. 197, 209-10 (1963).
118See A. T. Burch, Press Coverage of Trials-Is
Cause of Justice Hindered?, Chicago Daily News, May
30. 1964, p. 17, col. 8: "It is the parties to the trialnot only the defendants, but the prosecution, the witnesses, and even the public treasury-that suffer inconvenience and expense if a new trial is ordered by a
reviewing court [because of prejudicial publicity]."
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reversed without remand, by the danger that one
who may be a criminal remains at large-while the
guilty press is allowed to go free. And, as we have
seen, the method which would punish the press by
contempt is rarely resorted to.
Summary
It appears that the above methods, as currently
practiced by American courts, are inadequate solutions to the freedom of the press-fair trial conflict,u9 for the following brief reasons: (1) con1944.35% of the persons responding to the writer's

tempt, because of disuse; (2) trial level reliefs
because of disuse and lack of deterrent effect; (3)
cautionary instructions, because of human nature;
and (4) reversal, because of disuse, failure to protect sovereign rights, and lack of deterrent effect.

poll agreed that the existing law fails to protect a defendant's right to a fair trial. See Table I, in Part II
of this article. Moreover, 12.44% of those responding
that the law generally is adequate in this regard
stated that it is not adequate in highly publicized cases.
I/id.

